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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 89-0262-CA

ROY W. HALL,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Appellant relies on his opening brief, and refers this
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues,
the case, the facts, and summary of the argument•

Appellant

responds to the State's answer to the opening brief as follows:
I.
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN LIMITING THE VOIR DIRE OF APPELLANT'S JURORS•
A. REFUSAL TO ASK REQUESTED VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS
Respondent initially claims that the record in
insufficient to support Appellant's claim that the trial court
failed to ask requested voir dire questions.

As reflected in

pages 68 through 71 of the transcript, the trial court gave
Appellant the opportunity to make a record of the bench
conference during which the additional voir dire questions were
requested.

Appellant recognizes that the trial court did not

think that Appellant had requested that the jurors be questioned
regarding their acquaintances in the county attorney's office (T.
1

Respondent's brief at 6.
1

69), but notes that defense counsel indicated that she did ask
the court to inquire into that topic (T. 69)• The trial court
specifically recognized that defense counsel's objections to the
court's failure to ask the requested questions were timely,
stating, "[Y]ou have your record." (T* 71).
Appellant counters the State's assertion that Appellant
has failed to demonstrate the relevance of the requested voir
2
dire questions by reference to the standard of propriety of
voir dire questions set forth by the Utah Supreme Court:
All that is necessary for a voir dire
question to be appropriate is that it allow
"defense counsel to exercise his peremptory
challenges more intelligently."
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (1988).

The questions

requested by Appellant and refused by the trial court (questions
concerning juror leadership roles, experience as jury
forepersons, study of law, experience in the military,
relationship with members of the county attorney's office,
membership in the LDS church, views on the crime of rape, and
views on the punishment in this case) would have given defense
counsel insight into the perspectives of the prospective jurors
and allowed her to exercise peremptory challenges more
intelligently, and were thus "relevant" voir dire questions under
Utah law.
Finally, Appellant has shown prejudice resulting from
the trial court's failure to ask the requested voir dire

2

Respondent's brief at 6, 7.
2

questions;

as a result of the trial court's failure to ask the

voir dire questions, Appellant was tried by a jury led by a
foreperson related to the deputy county attorney (T. 353-405).
Compare State v, Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1056-1060 (Utah
1984)(reversible error committed in trial for driving under the
influence of alcohol when trial court refused to ask voir dire
question relating to the religious basis for juror abstention
from drinking, when abstinent juror sat on jury)•
B. STIFLING MOTIF IN CONDUCTING VOIR DIRE
The state indirectly defends the trial court's
dictating answers to voir dire questions, by claiming that
Appellant failed to provide legal analysis or authority in
raising the issue, and failed to show prejudice resulting from
the court's dictating the answers to the voir dire questions.
The legal authority and analysis that supports
Appellant's objections and concerns about the trial court's
dictating answers to voir dire questions is found at pages 6-12
of Appellant's opening brief.

In summary, the Utah Constitution

Article 1 sections 7, 10, and 12, and the fifth and sixth
amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee Appellant
a fair trial.
to a fair trial.

Inadequate voir dire violates a defendant's right
To be adequate, voir dire should be conducted

3

Respondent claims otherwise.

Respondent's brief page

4

Appellant's opening brief at 9.

7.

5
Appellant's opening brief at 8, 9, citing State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 448, 448 (Utah 1988).
3

in a manner which reveals latent biases of jurors.

6

In dictating

the answers to the questions, and in refusing to entertain
7
questions from the jurors, the court effectively told the jurors
not to reveal their known biases, and squelched any possibility
of evoking responses indicative of latent biases.^

j n conducting

the voir dire in this purpose-defeating manner, the court
9
violated appellant's right to a fair trial.
As Appellant noted in the opening brief, the court's
manner of conducting the voir dire resulted in a dearth of
information about the jury panel.

This lack of information not

only hindered Appellant's ability to exercise his peremptory
6
Appellant's opening brief at 8, 11-12, citing State v.
Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984); State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d
839, 844-845 (Utah 1988).
7
The State apparently interpreted the court as willing
to entertain questions from jurors on an individual basis.
Respondent's brief at 8.
When Juror 1 asked permission to ask the court a
question, the court responded, "Now, ma'am, when you say ask a
question, let me continue. I don't want to start opening it up
for questions because it's just not wise. If I need to, I'll
take you separatly [sic] and see what your question is." (T.
37).
Appellant asserts that when the court told the jurors
that he would entertain questions from them on an individual
basis if the court saw fit, and then failed to take the question
from the Juror 1 on an individual basis, the court in essence
told the jurors that their questions were not welcomed unless
requested by the court. In refusing to allow the jurors to ask
questions during the voir dire, the court may have missed the
opportunity to clarify voir dire questions for the jurors, and
discouraged the jurors from participating in the voir dire in an
open and meaningful fashion.
8
Appellant's opening brief at 9-11, citing transcript
pages 35-55).
9

Appellant's opening brief at 6, 7.
4

challenges effectively, but also hinders his ability to point
specifically to evidence of prejudice resulting from the court's
manner of conducting voir dire.

Appellant again refers this

Court to State v> Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988), where the
court explained that cases involving particularly abhorrent
publicized facts, and involving weak evidence of guilt,
effective voir dire is crucial.

Ici. at 845.

Because this case

involved abhorrent and publicized facts, and because this case
had weak evidence of Appellant's intent, a thorough voir dire was
essential, and the trial court's failure to conduct the voir dire
properly created a great risk of harm to Appellant.

In these

circumstances, where the threat of prejudice is great, but
specific proof of prejudice cannot be shown, it should be
presumed.

Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972)(plurality

opinion)(recognizing that because prejudice in racist jury
selection is so pervasive and harmful, and yet so difficult to
prove, it should be presumed).
II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING
THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF JESSICA HADFIELD.
In response to Appellant's observation that the trial
court violated the hearsay rule in admitting the seven speech
board messages into evidence, the State first argues that the
admission of the statements did not violate Appellant's right to
confrontation.

10

The State's confrontation clause analysis,

Appellant's brief at 14,
5

however, is inapplicable to Appellant's hearsay objection.

The

hearsay rule and the confrontation clause are separate and
different, California v. Green, 399 U,S. 149, 155-156 (1970), and
Appellant is not claiming that the admission of the speech board
messages violated his right to confrontation.
The argument provided by the State that applies to
Appellant's argument concerning the hearsay rule is that any
error committed in the admission of the speech board messages was
either waived or rendered harmless by defense counsel's
discussion of the messages during cross-examination.
Respondent's brief at 11-13.
Before Appellant began addressing the speech board
messages, he was granted a continuing hearsay objection (T.
112).

After the prosecutor was allowed to admit the evidence

over Appellant's objection, Appellant was entitled to examine
witnesses concerning the evidence, and did not waive his
objection in doing so.

See e.g., State v. Guinn, 752 P.2d 632,

636 (Idaho App. 1988)(after motion to suppress is denied and
evidence is admitted, defendant's introduction of testimony on
that evidence does not waive objection to its admissibility).
Had Appellant been the party to introduce testimony
concerning the speech board messages, Respondent's argument that
Appellant's discussion of the speech board messages rendered the
State's discussion of them harmless error would be appropriate.
However, it was only after the court determined that the speech
board messages were admissible and the prosecution introduced
6

testimony about them that Appellant had a need to address the
messages.

Appellant's attempts to defuse the impact of the

speech board messages should not translate the admission of the
evidence into harmless error - Appellant has a right to a fair
trial and a right to an appeal, and should not be forced to
choose between the two.
Appellant maintains that the speech board messages were
inadmissible hearsay statements, which prejudiced Appellant's
case.

They improperly bolstered the testimony of Jessica

Hadfield and were admitted solely to induce the jurors to
convict Appellant because they sympathized with Jessica
Hadfield8s victimization.
III.
THE COURT'S PERFORMANCE
DURING THE SENTENCING PHASE OF
APPELLANT'S TRIAL WAS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS, AND DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS.
Apparently because Appellant has not yet succeeded in
supplementing the record in this case with the press coverage of
12
the proceedings in the trial court,
to which press coverage
11
Appellant encourages the members of this Court to view
Exhibit 1 and to notice the torn and crumpled condition of some
of the speech board messages, yet another overture to the jurors
to sympathize with the pain felt by Jessica Hadfield.
12
On June 30, 1989, Appellant first moved in this Court
to supplement the record in this case with all press coverage of
this case. This motion was based on the grounds that the trial
court indicated it had been exposed to the press coverage of the
case. On July 26, 1989, this Court denied the motion, apparently
because Appellant did not specify the news items to be added to
the record.
On July 31, 1989, Appellant amended the motion to
supplement the record with the specific items of news coverage of
the case that the trial court admitted having watched and read.
7

Judge Wilkinson admitted his exposure, Respondent claims that
there is no evidence that the trial court was influenced by the
press in sentencing Appellant.

Respondent's brief at 13-16*

While Appellant is hopeful that the record in this case
will eventually contain the press coverage of this case that
Judge Wilkinson admitted having read and watched, Appellant's
claim that the trial court violated due process in conducting the
sentencing phase of Appellant's trial stands, regardless of the
supplementation of the record.
Appellate counsel concedes that the media coverage of
this case other than that to which Judge Wilkinson admitted
exposure is not relevant to this case and should not have been
13
included in the appendix to Appellant's opening brief.
However, it is appropriate for this Court to read the Salt Lake
14
Tribune article which Judge Wilkinson admitted having read
and
for this Court to view the videotape of the KUTV news
This Court denied that amended motion on August 3, 1989,
apparently because the trial court had not been given the
opportunity to rule on the motion.
Appellant then moved in the trial court to supplement
the record with the specific items of news coverage to which the
court had been exposed, as indicated on the record during the
sentencing phase of this case. The trial court denied this
motion August 30, 1989.
The trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to
supplement the record is currently on appeal before this Court
in case number 890532-CA, which appeal, by order of this Court
dated September 14, 1989, will be briefed in ten page memoranda
and consolidated with the instant appeal during oral arguments.
13
Appellate counsel, Elizabeth Holbrook, is responsible
for and regrets appending the articles of April 15, 1988,
November 20, 1988, and November 22, 1988.
14

Article of November 19, 1988.
8

broadcasts

which Judge Wilkinson admitted having watched during

the sentencing phase of Appellant's trial (T.2 14, 30, 35). This
fact is supported by reference to State v. Harvey, 491 P.2d 660
(Wash.App. 1971).
In Harvey, the defendant pled guilty to three counts of
armed robbery.

Id., at 661.

On appeal, he challenged, inter

alia, his ability to enter the guilty pleas.

IcI. In raising the

issue of competency on appeal, the defendant appended an
affidavit indicating that at the time the crimes were committed,
and apparently at the time he entered the guilty pleas, he was
under the custody of a mental hospital.

Jxi. at 662. While the

affidavit was not presented to the trial court, and therefore was
not technically evidence in the record on appeal, the appellate
court found that the fact that the substance of the affidavit
was brought to the trial court's attention justified appellate
consideration.

The court stated:

The affidavit cannot be considered as
evidence in the case because it was not a
part of the record on appeal. We can,
however, consider the affidavit as a part of
the defendant's brief where it raises a
constitutional issue and is supported by the
record.
Id. at 662 (citation omitted).
In this case, the record supports Appellant's assertion
that Judge Wilkinson read the Tribune article and saw the KUTV
news coverage of November 19, 1988 (T.2 14, 30, 35). Further,
Appellant asked the court to insulate itself from the press by
15

Broadcasts on November 19, 1988.
9

closing the sentencing proceedings to the press (T.2 13, 44) and
warned the court that the inflammatory press coverage of the case
was jeopardizing Appellant's right to a fair sentencing (To2 13).
The trial court refused to close the sentencing phase to the
press (T.2 14, 44-45), admitted exposure to the inflammatory
press coverage (T.2 14, 30, 35), and found that the court was not
influenced by the exposure to the press (T.2 31).
Because the Tribune article and KUTV news coverage were
evaluated by the court below, and because they support
Appellant's claim that his constitutional rights were violated
during the sentencing phase, this Court should view those
articles, regardless of whether or not they are technically made
part of the record.

See Harvey at 662.

In the event that this Court declines to examine the
press articles, Appellant notes that the transcripts of the
sentencing phase provide "record" evidence that the court was
influenced during the sentencing phase by either the press or by
the actions of defense counsel.
pages 19-28.

See Appellant's opening brief,

Respondent states that due process requires "that

the trial court's sentence be based on factual information and
defendant's background."

Respondent's brief at 14, citing State

v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 864-865 (Utah 1979).

In basing

Appellant's sentence on either the influence of the press or the
court's anger at defense counsel, the court violated Appellant's
right to due process during the sentencing phase of his trial.
Id.

See also Appellant's opening brief, pages 31-34.
10

CONCLUSION
Because of the errors committed during the voir dire of
the jurors and in the admission of the hearsay speech board
messages, Appellant is entitled to a new trial.

At the very

least, this Court should remand this case for sentencing that
complies with standards of due process.
Respectfully submitted this /X-^day of
1989.

,?./
NANCY

•efeiidant/ Appellant
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